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90 days after the claim arises. At the discretion of the court, leave
may be granted to serve this notice late in certain cases, 7 if ap-
plication for such leave is made within a year and explains the rea-
son for the delay. 8  Claims brought by infants may be afforded
this additional time.39  In the instant case, the claimant was al
infant; but sixteen months elapsed after the injury before such
leave was applied for. Upon its denial, plaintiff appealed, assert.
ing that the statute deprived him of the equal protection of the
laws.40  Upon the reasoning outlined above, the statute was held




-In New York, claim of title has been defined to mean an entry
upon another's land without right and in hostility to the owner's
title.1 Good faith as an element in the definition had long been
rejected.' The intent to claim land as one's own can be founded
on either knowledge that it belongs to another, or upon a mistaken
belief that it is already the claimant's. 3 The intent can be proved
by acts as well as words. 'Where the intent is professed to be ex-
pressed by acts, those acts must be of such a character as to inform
the owner unequivocally of the hostile claim of the usurper.5 If
37. Natoll v. Board of Education of City of Norwich, 303 N. Y. 646, 101 N. E. 2d
761 (1951).
38. Matter of McEwan v. City of New York, 304 N. Y. 628, - N. E. 2d -(1952).
39. For a discussion of § 50-e as creating an exception to Crvm PRACTIcE AcT § 60,
see Note, 1 EFLO. L. REv. 64 (1951).
40. U. S. Coxsr. A~mmsa. XIV; NEw Yorx Co NsT. Art I, § 1.
41. See Schnid v. Werner, 303 N. Y. 754, 103 N. E. 2d 540 (1952) affirming 277App. Div. 520, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 860 (1st Dep't 1950), for a discussion of the applicability
of the notice requirement to an action against an individual torifeasor in municipality's
employ when the action is based upon a tort committed in the course of employment.
1. Smith v. Burtes, 9 John. 174 (N. Y. 1812).
2. Humbert v. Trinity Church, 24 Wend. 587 (N. Y. 1840). This case settled theissue with finality, and was necessitated by the decision in La Frambois v. Jackson, 8
Cow. 589 (N. Y. 1826), which impliedly asserted that good faith was indispensable to
the establishment of a claim of title.
3. Belotti v. Bickhardt, 228 N. Y. 296, 127 N. E. 239 (1920); Barnes v. Light,
116 N. Y. 34, 22 N. E. 441 (1889).
4. Barnes v. Light, supra n. 3.
5. Monnot v. Murphy, 267 N. Y. 240, 100 N. E. 749 (1913).
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the usurper had at a prior time actual or implied consent to use
the land, the acts relied upon as conveying such information to
the owner must be all the more clear in order to overcome the pre-
sumption of -subordination to the title of the owner." If the
usurper is a stranger, the burden is lightened, but the acts relied
upon must at least consist of either a substantial enclosure, or
usual cultivation, or some improvement.7 This rationale is in ac-
cord -4ith the policy underlying the statute of repose, i. e., to bar
the delinquent owner from asserting any right to redress the ad-
verse occupation of his land."
With this background before it, the Court of Appeals in the
last term rendered its decision in Van Volkenburg v. Lutz.9 The
facts of that case were as follows: the land in question was orig-
inally covered with a natural wild growth of brush and small trees.
The defendant Lutz owned the adjoining property. He entered
upon the land in question, cleared it, and from 1916 up until 1948
used nearly all of it as a truck farm. It was referred to by neigh-
bors as "Mr. Lutz's garden." He also raised chickens on the
premises, and constructed coops and sheds for that purpose. In
1920 he built a one room dwelling on the land which his brother
inhabited. A garage he erected on his property also extended
over onto the disputed land. The plaintiff purchased title to the
land from the City of Yonkers in 1947. He then sued Lutz to re-
cover possession, and to obtain removal of the encroachments.
Lutz alleged as an affirmative defense, and as a counterclaim, title
to the premises by right of adverse possession.
The Official Referee found that title to the property had
vested in Lutz by virtue of adverse possession as of the year 1935.
The Court of Appeals (4-3) reversed this finding. The majority
opinion, written by Judge Dye, stated: (1) The essential elements
of proof, i. e., protection by a substantial enclosure, or usual cul-
tivation, or improvement, were not met because there was no
proof of a substantial enclosure, the cultivation did not embrace
the whole of the premises by "clear and positive" proof, as he
construed the Civil Practice Act §40 to require, and there was no
evidence of any improvement; (2) Lutz did not have a claim of
title to the whole of the premises because he knew the land was not
his own; nor to the part on which his garage encroached, because
6. Hinkley v. State of N. Y., 234 N. Y. 309, 137 N. E. 325 (1922) ; Doherty v.
Matsell, 119 N. Y. 646, 23 N. E. 994 (1890) ; and see §§ 41-41a N. Y. C. P. A.
7. Belotti v. Bickhardt, supra n. 3; Barnes v. Light, sutpra n. 3; and see § 40
N. Y. C. P. A.
8. Humbert v. Trinity Churchsupra n. 2.
9. 304 N. Y. 95, 106 N. E. 2d 28 (1952).
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Lutz mistakenly believed it was his own property, and hence, did
not have a hostile, intent.
The dissenting opinion, written by Judge Fuld, reasoned:
(1) that the test of evidence should be formulated in light of the
Practice Act's object, i. e., an enclosure, or cultivation, or improve-
ment sufficient to convey to the real owner knowledge of the
usurper's claim, and that here the evidence met that test; (2) the
fact that Lutz knew.he did not have title to the premises is imma-
terial, for good faith is not necessary for a claim of title, it being
sufficient that Lutz intended to acquire the property as his own.
The effect of the decision would seem to be to work a substan-
tial alteration of the now traditional understanding of claim of
title. Traditionally, claim of title meant the intent to claim the land
as one 's own; good faith and mistake as elements had been interred
in the distant past. For the court to ressurect their forms today
has the following results: A., who occupies B's land, knowing it
is B's land, does not have a claim of title, because he did not enter
in good faith believing the land to be his own; A., who occupies
B's land, believing it to be his own land, does not have a claim of
title, either, because by his mistake he did not enter in hostility to
B. As a consequence, the concept of claim of title is now reduced
to one rare and novel situation: A., who occupies B's land, recog-
nizes that title in the premise is in dispute, but he believes he has
a claim to it (ergo, good faith), and that B. also has a claim to it
(ergo, hostility), but that he, A., intends to assert his superior
right.
It is submitted that the Court's redefinition of claim of title,
taken at face value, has greatly confined the doctrine of adverse
possession in New York. Since this redefinition conflicts with the
policy underlaying the doctrine of adverse possession, i. e., to bar
the delinqent owner's right to redress the adverse occupation of
his land, it is submitted the decision is erroneous. Consequently,
a doubt arises whether Van Vnlkenbur.q v. Lutz will be strictly
followed.
Mortqages
In the case of Shohfi v. Shohfi'0 the Court of Appeals was
presented with an interesting aspect of the legal problem in-
volved in accepting a deed which states it is "subject to a mort-
gage." The defendant was the husband of the plaintiff. He had
acquired title to a'parcel of land in 1929 by a conveyance from
his wife. In return, he gave her a bond and purchase money mort-
10. 303 N. Y. 370, 103 N. E. 2d 330 (1952).
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